Double Handshake

Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-jeou heads to Central American this week for visits to three of the island’s remaining diplomatic allies in the region. Ma is expected to land in Panama on Wednesday for the presidential inauguration of Ricardo Martinelli and then spend the rest of the week splitting time in Nicaragua and Honduras. All three countries, along with twenty other nations worldwide, still recognize Taiwan instead of the PRC as their diplomatic partner.

Not especially good timing for a visit to Honduras, to say the least. A military coup on Sunday exiled president Manuel Zeyala, still in his pajamas, to Costa Rica. Electricity has been barely functional in Tegucigalpa over the past few days, and Zeyala ally Hugo Chavez has put his country’s armed forces on alert. Surprisingly, as of yesterday afternoon, Taiwan’s leadership has said Ma’s itinerary hasn’t changed despite “tensions” in Honduras. He is still planning on signing a joint communique on bilateral cooperation with Zeyala. Don’t hold your breath on this one. — In fact, as I am set to publish this post, here comes news that Ma has indeed canceled the Honduras portion of his trip.

But beyond the Honduras quagmire, there seems to be a new dynamic at play between Taiwan and the PRC in their “chequebook war” for influence in Central America. The Economist has more:

SINCE he took office in May last year, Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s president, has presented himself as a peacemaker, seeking to ease tensions with China. This conciliatory approach has led to the first regular cross-strait flights, the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists and investors, and the attendance by a delegation from Taiwan as observers at the United Nations’ World Health Assembly in May, for the first time since China took Taiwan’s UN seat in 1971. Now, Mr Ma told The Economist this week, he believes China has even adopted the surprising policy of refusing requests from countries that recognise Taiwan to switch their diplomatic ties to China instead.

This is scoop is both astonishing and head-scratching. Given the above context, the article seems to suggest that the PRC is offering a “truce” (meaning it will stop poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies) as a something of a goodwill gesture toward the island. Officially, China strongly opposes any country having diplomatic relations with Taiwan and has spent billions in investment projects and aid to ensure those countries recognize Beijing over Taipei. Over the last twenty years, there’s been no question which side has overwhelmingly been winning this chequebook war.

So, why would China, the unequivocal “winner,” now refuse requests from countries hoping to switch ties from Taipei to Beijing, as Ma claims it is? Is it goodwill toward Taiwan, or something else? It indeed might be that the warming Beijing-Taipei ties mentioned in the above article incline China to goodwill gestures such as these. Certainly having good relations with Taiwan is a much higher priority for Beijing’s leadership than its relationship with any Central American country. Comments from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton about China’s “disturbing” new presence in Latin America may have also factored into Beijing laying low in the region for awhile.

Whatever the reason, China’s goodwill “truce” in Central America may explain the case of El Salvador. When Mauricio Funes won El Salvador’s presidential election in March, he vowed to switch ties from Taiwan to the PRC upon taking office on June 1. Then, a strange thing happened. At his inauguration, Funes changed his mind. “On the basis of the long friendship and cooperation between the two countries, I promise to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan,” reported the Taiwan News. It may have been that Funes had a sudden change of heart, but most likely, China’s leadership put him off for awhile. Panama, whose whose president-elect is also rumored to favor switching ties to Beijing, may find itself in the same position as El Salvador, playing the waiting game until it gets the green light from Beijing.

Chinese negotiators were in San Jose, Costa Rica yesterday for the third round of talks over the terms of a free trade agreement, which is expected to be signed later this year. Costa Rica only switched diplomatic ties to the PRC from Taiwan two years ago. Unlike China’s other exsisting FTAs (with Chile and Peru), copper and other mineral commodities are not at the heart of the deal. Costa Rica’s major exports to China include agricultural products and meat. The Central American country is also notable exporter of computer parts.

The Atlantic has published a nice dispatch by Paul Starobin recounting his lunch with China’s ambassador to Chile, Liu Yuqin. Over the “eight course, two-hour affair,” Starobin and Liu play cat and mouse over China’s intentions in Latin America. One excerpt:

I asked if Chileans should be concerned about the Chinese succeeding the Spanish and the Americans as the new imperialists of South America. “It’s not like China comes in to ransack this country of its raw materials—China pays for these raw materials,” she noted evenly. When I pointed out that a union of Chilean copper workers had taken a stand against China’s bid to become an owner of the Gaby mine, she said, “As in all families, brothers can have an argument.”

That type of answer is about par for the course. It’s disappointing but non entirely surprising that Starobin can’t draw Liu into any firmer answers than ones like the above. He asks a number of good questions, ranging from China’s take on the Monroe Doctrine to prospects for China-Chile military exchanges in the future. Despite the article’s title: “China’s Copper Road,” the conversation strays far from the usual China’s-hunger-for-commodities coverage, which is refreshing.

It’s a colorful lunch and well worth your time.

The Tiananmen anniversary stories are just about wrapping up by this time. Medias around the world filed stories about Beijing’s efforts (some involving umbrellas) to hush up foreign correspondents and shoo Beijingers from the square. I sent a favorite China blog, The China Beat a couple of paragraphs about the minimal media response from Lima, Peru. Today, though, I wanted to add one more note to that brief dispatch in light of a new Tiananmen reference from Peru that came across my desk today.

First, a quick bit of background. In the past few days, violence has erupted between police and indigenous groups in Peru’s Amazon jungle over land use rights of the rainforest. Local people are rioting over the government’s plan to open the region for oil, gas and mineral exploration. Possibly up to 100 people have been killed in and around Bagua, the deadliest instance of social unrest since the mid-1990s clashes between police and the Shining Path.

Given the timing, Survival International, a London-based NGO that advocates for tribal peoples’ rights and its director Stephen Corry, has come up with an analogy for the protests in the Amazon:

Their protests signal that the colonial era has finally drawn to a close. No longer are Amazon Indians prepared to put up with the illegal and brutal treatment which has been routine. That’s finished. This is the Amazon’s Tiananmen. If it finishes the same way, it will also end Peru’s international reputation.

Corry goes on to call for oil companies operating in the region to suspend their operations until calm has been restored and indigenous groups are given a fair listen.

It’s fascinating to me how Tiananmen is invoked here. On the most basic level, “Amazon’s Tiananmen” is similar to the original in that it, at first blush, involves an oppressive government cracking down on its people. Never mind that the circumstances around “Amazon’s Tiananmen” have almost nothing in common with the original besides this fact. This week’s “Tiananmen” has nothing to do with political corruption and fundamental government reform, nothing near the international visibility, nor are the protesters largely non-violent as they were in the original.

But notice the second part: If it finishes the same way, it will also end Peru’s international reputation. This week’s protesters in the rain forest will likely not be able to fundamentally change the course of Lima’s business plans in the region anymore than Beijing students were able to twenty years ago. Nevertheless, the blood being shed may serve to damage Lima’s international reputation as it did for Beijing. Here, invoking the Tiananmen analogy does not ask Amazonians to expect to “win” in their struggle anymore than student protesters “won” twenty years ago. Take heart martyrs, Survival International seems to be arguing, this is the price you pay for favorable media coverage.

Will the foreign response to this week’s violence in Peru rival that in Tiananmen two decades ago? I doubt it, for a couple of reasons.

First, Beijing’s Tiananmen became such a huge event internationally partly because foreign medias were already in the capital covering Gorbachev’s highly publicized visit to China. The large amount of coverage that Tiananmen received in 1989 was partly due to the fact that a number of world-wide media outlets happened to find themselves in the right place at the right time. Contrast that with the isolation of Bagua, Peru and the limited amount of information available. I’m not expecting an iconic “tank man” photo to emerge from this week’s unrest.

Second, despite indigenous peoples’ rights being an utterly worthy cause in my view, it does not have the sex appeal of protesters for “democracy.” Indeed, part of the foreign fascination with Beijing’s Tiananmen was in how easily the media was able to pit the sides: Evil Communist government vs. Good Democratic protesters. Of course the reality was much more complicated, but how easily a news story can be consumed becomes a major factor in how well-known it can become with the public.

Finally, foreign conglomerates are at the heart of this week’s protests, unlike Tiananmen, which was largely an internal affair. Survival International’s article urges foreign oil firms – Anglo-French’s Perenco, Argentina’s PlusPetrol, Canada’s Petrolifera, Spain’s Repsol, Brazil’s Petrobras – to suspend business until calm has been restored. The foreign interests at play in Peru, I think, will weaken the potential for a unified international denouncement of Peru’s government the same way there was in the wake of Tiananmen. Simply put, huge foreign companies (their lobbyists, their employees, their crisis-inflicted governments) have something to gain in Lima eventually having its way in the jungle. In the end, these powerful players, and their money and influence may find a way to ensure that the Amazonians’ plight doesn’t too closely resemble the students’ and workers’ who took to the streets twenty years ago last week.

Image: BBC

The China Beat has been publishing an interesting collection of reactions from around the world to this week’s 20-year anniversary of the Tiananmen protests. In the three-part series, dispatches have come in from Hannoi, Tokyo, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Italy, Singapore and India. I added a brief Latin American perspective, on Peru’s media coverage of the anniversary that you can read here.

Apologies for the recent lack of activity here. I’ve been traveling (currently in Puerto Varas, Chile) and have been trying to keep computer time to a minimum.

Anyone who travels is occasionally (or constantly) reminded of where he has been. Whether we like it or not, a mountain skyline, a village’s music, a drive along a coast remind us of past travels. So, in the spirit of my time on the road (and this blog’s theme), I thought I’d offer up some thoughts on places I’ve been and the China destinations they reminded me of (however superficially). Fellow travelers, add your own additions below!

1. Cuzco, Peru – Lijiang, Yunnan
Though historically these two destinations are nowhere near the same size (Lijiang was a small picturesque Naxi village, while Cuzco was capital of the Incan empire), the cobblestone streets, the mountain backdrop and pushy tourism industries put these two cities in the same league for me. Actually, Cuzco struck me as a mix between Lijiang and the Yunnan backpacker mecca Dali, with its narrow winding alleys lined with tour agencies, pizza restaurants, cafés and bars.

2. Iquique, Chile – Qingdao, Shandong
Both sprawling seaports combine good seafood, high-rise construction and patches of urban beaches. Iquique is hemmed in by large sand dunes to the east, while Qingdao is now pushing up against Lao Shan in the same direction. Though not in the red-roof Bavarian style of Qingdao, Iquique’s Plaza Prat retains its own early 20th century architectural flavor. Also, while nowhere near as famous as Tsingtao beer, Iquique even has its own local brew: Iquiqueño.

3. San Pedro de Atacama, Chile – Kashgar, Xinjiang
Aside from both being desert towns, these two cities initially seem to share little else in common: The former is a largely traditional Muslim town with heavy influences from “the Stans” across the border; the latter is a tiny backpacker bastion in the Atacama Desert. However, the dust and sand, the starry nights and stone/adobe buildings in San Pedro reminded me more of Kashgar’s old quarter than any other place I’d been. Now, if only llamas and alpacas could survive in the desert like camels do in the Silk Road town.

4. Lake Titicaca, Peru/Bolivia – Tai Lake, Jiangsu
Who would have thought that setting out from Puno, Peru, the world’s highest navigable lake is presently slimed like one of China’s high-profile ecological disasters? As you head out further into Lake Titicaca, however, the green algae layer recedes and the water takes on the deep blue unlike anything found in Central China.